Sunday, April 22, 2012

Panchayati Raj


Panchayati Raj (Rule of Village Committee) system is a three-tier system in the state with elected bodies at the Village, Taluk and District levels. It ensures greater participation of people and more effective implementation of rural development programmes. There will be a Grama Panchayat for a village or group of villages, a Taluk level and the Zilla Panchayat at the district level.
India has a chequered history of Panchayati Raj starting from a self-sufficient and self-governing village communities that survived the rise and fall of empires in the past to the modern legalized institutions of governance at the third tier provided with Constitutional support.

Early history
During the time of the Rig-Veda (1200 BC), evidences suggest that self-governing village bodies called 'sabhas' existed. With the passage of time, these bodies became panchayats (council of five persons). Panchayats were functional institutions of grassroots Governance in almost every village. The Village Panchayat or elected council had large powers, both executive and judicial. Land was distributed by this panchayat which also collected taxes out of the produce and paid the government's share on behalf of the village. Above a number of these village councils there was a larger panchayat or council to supervise and interfere if necessary.  Casteism and feudalistic system of governance under Mughal rule in the medieval period slowly eroded the self-government in villages. A new class of feudal chiefs and revenue collectors (zamindars) emerged between the ruler and the people. And, so began the stagnation and decline of self-government in villages.
During the British rule, the autonomy of panchayats gradually declined with the establishment of local civil and criminal courts, revenue and police organisations, the increase in communications, the growth of individualism and the operation of the individual Ryotwari '(landholder-wise) system as against the Mahalwari or village tenure system.
During British rule
The panchayat had never been the priority of the British rulers.  The rulers were interested in the creation of 'controlled' local bodies, which could help them in their trading interests by collecting taxes for them. When the colonial administration came under severe financial pressure after the 1857 uprising, the remedy sought was decentralisation in terms of transferring responsibility for road and public works to local bodies. However, the thrust of this 'compelled' decentralisation was with respect to municipal administration..
"The panchayat was destroyed by the East India Company when it was granted the office of Diwan in 1765 by the Mughal Emperor as part of reparation after his defeat at Buxar. As Diwan the Company took two decisions. The first was that it abolished the village land record office and created a company official called Patwari. The Patwari became the official record keeper for a number of villages. The second was the creation of the office of magistrate and the abolition of village police. The magistrate carried out policing functions through the Darogha who had always been a state functionary under the Faujdar. The primary purpose of these measures was the collection of land revenue by fiat. The depredations of the Patwari and the Darogha are part of our folklore and it led to the worst famine in Bengal. The effects of the famine lingered right to the end of the 18th century. These two measures completely disempowered the village community and destroyed the panchayat. After 1857 the British tried to restore the panchayat by giving it powers to try minor offences and to resolve village disputes. But these measures never restored the lost powers of the village community."
From 1870 that Viceroy Lord Mayo's Resolution (for decentralisation of power to bring about administrative efficiency in meeting people's demand and to add to the finances of colonial regime) gave the needed impetus to the development of local institutions. It was a landmark in the evolution of colonial policy towards local government. The real benchmarking of the government policy on decentralisation can, however, be attributed to Lord Ripon who, in his famous resolution on local self-government on May 18, 1882, recognised the twin considerations of local government: (i) administrative efficiency and (ii) political education. The ‘’’Ripon Resolution’’’, which focused on towns, provided for local bodies consisting of a large majority of elected non-official members and presided over by a non-official chairperson. This resolution met with resistance from colonial administrators. The progress of local self-government was tardy with only half-hearted steps taken in setting up municipal bodies. Rural Decentralisation remained a neglected area of administrative reform.
The Royal Commission on Decentralisation (1907) under the chairmanship of C.E.H. Hobhouse recognised the importance of panchayats at the village level. The commission recommended that "it is most desirable, alike in the interests of decentralisation and in order to associate the people with the local tasks of administration, that an attempt should be made to constitute and develop village panchayats for the administration of local village affairs".
But, the Montague-Chemsford reforms (1919) brought local self-government as a provincial transferred subject, under the domain of Indian ministers in the provinces. Due to organisational and fiscal constraints, the reform was unable to make panchayat institutions truly democratic and vibrant. However, the most significant development of this period was the 'establishment of village panchayats in a number of provinces, that were no longer mere ad hoc judicial tribunal, but representative institutions symbolising the corporate character of the village and having a wide jurisdiction in respect of civic matters'. l By 1925, eight provinces had passed panchayat acts and by 1926, six native states had also passed panchayat laws.
The provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act, 1935, marked the evolution of panchayats in India. Popularly elected governments in provinces enacted legislations to further democratise institutions of local self-government. But the system of responsible government at the grassroots level was least responsible. D.P. Mishra, the then minister for local self-government under the Government of India Act of 1935 in Central Provinces was of the view that 'the working of our local bodies... in our province and perhaps in the whole country presents a tragic picture... 'Inefficiency' and 'local body' have become synonymous terms....'.
 In spite of various committees such as the Royal Commission on Decentralization (1907) , the report of Montague and Chemsford on constitutional reform (1919), the Government of India Resolution (1918), etc., a hierarchical administrative structure based on supervision and control evolved. The administrator became the focal point of rural governance. The British were not concerned with decentralised democracy but were aiming for colonial objectives.
 The Indian National Congress from the 1920s to 1947, emphasized the issue of all-India Swaraj, and organized movements for Independence under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi. The task of preparing any sort of blueprint for the local level was neglected as a result. There was no consensus among the top leaders regarding the status and role to be assigned to the institution of rural local self-government; rather there were divergent views on the subject. On the one end Mr. Gandhi favoured Village Swaraj and strengthening the village panchayat to the fullest extent and on the other end, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar opposed this idea. He believed that the village represented regressive India, a source of oppression. The model state hence had to build safeguards against such social oppression and the only way it could be done was through the adoption of the parliamentary model of politics .  During the drafting of the Constitution of India, Panchayati Raj Institutions were placed in the non-justiciable part of the Constitution, the Directive Principles of State Policy, as Article 40. The Article read 'the State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government'. However, no worthwhile legislation was enacted either at the national or state level to implement it.
In the four decades since the adoption of the Constitution, panchayat raj institutions have travelled from the non-justiciable part of the Constitution to one where, through a separate amendment, a whole new status has been added to their history 
Post-independence period
Panchayat raj had to go through various stages. The First Five Year Plan failed to bring about active participation and involvement of the people in the Plan processes, which included Plan formulation implementation and monitoring. The Second Five Year Plan attempted to cover the entire countryside with National Extensive Service Blocks through the institutions of Block Development Officers, Assistant Development Officers, Village Level Workers, in addition to nominated representatives of village panchayats of that area and some other popular organisations like co-operative societies. But the plan failed to satisfactorily accomplish decentralisation. Hence, committees were constituted by various authorities to advise the Centre on different aspects of decentralisation.
The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957)
In 1957, Balwant Rai Mehta Committee studied the Community Development Projects and the National Extension Service and assessed the extent to which the movement had succeeded in utilising local initiatives and in creating institutions to ensure continuity in the process of improving economic and social conditions in rural areas. The Committee held that community development would only be deep and enduring when the community was involved in the planning, decision-making and implementation process. The suggestions were for as follows 
• an early establishment of elected local bodies and devolution to them of necessary resources, power and authority,
• that the basic unit of democratic decentralisation was at the block/ samiti level since the area of jurisdiction of the local body should neither be too large nor too small. The block was large enough for efficiency and economy of administration, and small enough for sustaining a sense of involvement in the citizens,
• such body must not be constrained by too much control by the government or government agencies,
• the body must be constituted for five years by indirect elections from the village panchayats,
• its functions should cover the development of agriculture in all its aspects, the promotion of local industries and others
• services such as drinking water, road building, etc., and
• the higher level body, Zilla Parishad, would play an advisory role.
The PRI structure did not develop the requisite democratic momentum and failed to cater to the needs of rural development. There are various reasons for such an outcome which include political and bureaucratic resistance at the state level to share power and resources with local level institutions, domination of local elites over the major share of the benefits of welfare schemes, lack of capability at the local level and lack of political will.
S K Dey : The first Minister for Panchayati Raj in India
Late Mr. S. K. Dey (1905–1989) piloted and steered the course of community development and Panchayati Raj in the challenging, formative period of India’s independence as Cabinet Minister of Cooperation and Panchayati Raj under the prime ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru. After Nehru’s death he took leave from Ministerial responsibilities to dedicate himself fully for the cause of Panchayati Raj as long as he lived.
K. Santhanam Committee (1963)
One of the prime areas of concern in this long debate on panchayati raj institutions was fiscal decentralisation. The K. Santhanam Committee was appointed to look solely at the issue of PRI finance, in 1963. The fiscal capacity of PRIs tends to be limited, as rich resources of revenue are pre-empted by higher levels of government, and issue is still debated today. The Committee was asked to determine issues related to sanctioning of grants to PRIs by the state government, evolving mutual financial relations between the three tiers of PRIs, gifts and donation, handing over revenue in full or part to PRIs. The Committee recommended the following 
• Panchayats should have special powers to levy special tax on land revenues and home taxes, etc.,
• People should not be burdened with too many demands (taxes),
• All grants and subventions at the state level should be mobilised and sent in a consolidated form to various PRIs,
• A Panchayat Raj Finance Corporation should be set up to look into the financial resource of PRIs at all levels, provide loans and financial assistance to these grassroots level governments and also provide non-financial requirements of villages.
These issues have been debated over the last three decades and have been taken up by the State Finance Commissions which are required to select taxes for assignment and sharing, identifying the principles for such sharing and assignment, determine the level of grants and recommend the final distribution of state's transfers to local authorities.20
Ashok Mehta Committee (1978)
With the coming of the Janata Party into power at the Centre in 1977, a serious view was taken of the weaknesses in the functioning of Panchayati Raj.] It was decided to appoint a high-level committee under the chairmanship of Ashok mehta to exa¬mine and suggest measures to strengthen PRIs. The Committee had to evolve an effective decentralised system of development for PRIs. They made the following recommendations .
• the district is a viable administrative unit for which planning, co-ordination and resource allocation are feasible and technical expertise available,
• PRIs as a two-tier system, with Mandal Panchayat at the base and Zilla Parishad at the top,
• the PRIs are capable of planning for themselves with the resources available to them,
• district planning should take care of the urban-rural continuum,
• representation of SCs and STs in the election to PRIs on the basis of their population,
• four-year term of PRIs,
• participation of political parties in elections,
• any financial devolution should be committed to accepting that much of the developmental functions at the district level would be played by the panchayats.
The states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal passed new legislation based on this report. However, the flux in politics at the state level did not allow these institutions to develop their own political dynamics.
G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985)
The G.V.K. Rao Committee was appointed to once again look at various aspects of PRIs. The Committee was of the opinion that a total view of rural development must be taken in which PRIs must play a central role in handling people's problems. It recommended the following .
• PRIs have to be activated and provided with all the required support to become effective organisations,
• PRIs at district district level and below should be assigned the work of planning, implementation and monitoring of rural development programmes, and
• the block development office should be the spinal cord of the rural development process.
L.M.Singhvi Committee (1986)
L.M. Singhvi Committee studied panchayatiraj. The Gram Sabha was considered as the base of a decentralised democracy, and PRIs viewed as institutions of self-governance which would actually facilitate the participation of the people in the process of planning and development. It recommended 
• local self-government should be constitutionally recognised, protected and preserved by the inclusion of new chapter in the Constitution,
• non-involvement of political parties in Panchayat elections.
The suggestion of giving panchayats constitutional status was opposed by the Sarkaria Commission, but the idea, however, gained momentum in the late 1980s especially because of the endorsement by the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who introduced the 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill in 1989. The 64th Amendment Bill was prepared and introduced in the lower house of Parliament. But it got defeated in the Rajya Sabha as non-convincing. He lost the general elections too. In 1989, the National Front introduced the 74th Constitutional Amendment Bill, which could not become an Act because of the dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha. All these various suggestions and recommendations and means of strengthening PRIs were considered while formulating the new Constitutional Amendment Act.
The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act
The idea that produced the 73rd Amendment was not a response to pressure from the grassroots, but to an increasing recognition that the institutional initiatives of the preceding decade had not delivered, that the extent of rural poverty was still much too large and thus the existing structure of government needed to be reformed. It is interesting to note that this idea evolved from the Centre and the state governments. It was a political drive to see PRIs as a solution to the governmental crises that India was experiencing. The Constitutional (73rd Amendment) Act, passed in 1992 by the Narasimha Rao government, came into force on April 24, 1993. It was meant to provide constitutional sanction to establish "democracy at the grassroots level as it is at the state level or national level". Its main features are as follows
• The Gram Sabha or village assembly as a deliberative body to decentralised governance has been envisaged as the foundation of the Panchayati Raj System.
• A uniform three-tier structure of panchayats at village (Gram Panchayat — GP), intermediate or block (Panchayat Samiti — PS) and district (Zilla Parishad — ZP) levels.
• All the seats in a panchayat at every level are to be filled by elections from respective territorial constituencies.
• Not less than one-third of the total seats for membership as well as office of chairpersons of each tier have to be reserved for women.
• Reservation for weaker castes and tribes (SCs and STs) have to be provided at all levels in proportion to their population in the panchayats.
• To supervise, direct and control the regular and smooth elections to panchayats, a State Election Commission has to be constituted in every State and UT.
• The Act has ensured constitution of a State Finance Commission in every State/UT, for every five years, to suggest measures to strengthen finances of PRIs.
• To promote bottom-up-planning, the District Planning Committee fDPC} in every district has been accorded constitutional status.
• An indicative list of 29 items has been given in Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. Panchayats are expected to play an effective role in planning and implementation of works related to these 29 items.

Present scenario
At present, there are about 3 million elected representatives at all levels of the panchayat one-third of which are women. These members represent more than 2.4 lakh Gram Panchayats, about 6,000 intermediate level tiers and more than 500 district panchayats . Spread over the length and breadth of the country, the new panchayats cover about 96 per cent of India's more than 5.8 lakh villages and nearly 99.6 per cent of rural population. This is the largest experiment in decentralisation of governance in the history of humanity.
The Constitution visualises panchayats as institutions of self-governance. However, giving due consideration to the federal structure of our polity, most of the financial powers and authorities to be endowed on panchayats have been left at the discretion of concerned state legislatures. Consequently, the powers and functions vested in PRIs vary from state to state. These provisions combine representative and direct democracy into a synergy and are expected to result in an extension and deepening of democracy in India. Hence, panchayats have journeyed from an institution within the culture of India to attain constitutional status.

Ashok Mehata Committee 1977


Due to the failure of Grama Panchayties , Morarji Desai Govt.  formed Ashok Mehata Committee.
In December 1977, the Janata Government appointed a committee on Panchayati Raj institutions under the chairmanship of Ashok Mehta. The committee submitted its report in August 1978 and made 132 recommendations to revive and strengthen the declining Panchayati Raj system in the country. As a result of this report, the Indian states of KarnatakaAndhra Pradesh, and West Bengal passed new legislation. However, the flow of politics at the state level did not allow the institutions to develop their own political dynamics.
Recommendations
The main recommendations of the committee are:
1. The 3-tier system of Panchayati Raj should be replaced by the 2-tier system: Zilla Parishad at the district level, and below it,the Mandal Panchayat consisting of a group of villages covering a population of 15000 to 20000.
2. A district should be the first point for decentralisation under popular supervision below the state level.
3. Zila Parishad should be the executive body and made responsible for planning at the district level.
4. There should be an official participation of political parties at all levels of Panchayat elections.
5. The Panchayat Raj institutions should have compulsory powers of taxation to mobilise their own financial resources.
6. There should be a regular social audit by a district level agency and by a committee of legislators to check whether the funds allotted for the vulnerable social and economic groups are actually spent on them.
7. The state government should not supersede the Panchayat Raj institutions. In case of an imperative supersession, election should be held within 6 months from the date of supersession.
8. The Nyaya Panchayats should be kept as separate bodies from that of development Panchayats. They should be presided over by a qualified judge.
9. The Chief Electoral Officer of the state in consultaton with the Chief Election Commissioner should organise and conduct the Panchayati Raj elections.
10. Development functions should be transferred to the Zila Parishad and all development staff should work under its control and supervision.
11. The voluntary agencies should play an important role in mobilising the support of the people for Panchayati Raj.
12. A minister for Panchayati Raj should be appointed in the state council of ministers to look after the affairs of the Panchayati Raj institutions.
13. Seats for SCs and STs should be reserved on the basis of their population. 

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Indian Nuclear Command Structure


Formalising the country's Nuclear Command and Central structure, India's Cabinet decided to place ultimate control of the country's Nuclear Forces in the hands of a Political Council chaired by Prime Minister. It took more than four and a half years after declaring itself a nuclear weapon power, to make public a set of Political Principles and administrative arrangements to manage its arsenal of atomic weapons. India has been under considerable pressure from the West to spell out its official policy on the use of nuclear weapons since Jan 2002 when India and Pak seemed to be on the brink of war. Pakistan had set up its " Nuclear Command Authority " in Feb 2000. It was Musharraf's, the man in control of the nuclear button of Pak, recent speech to the Pakistani Air Force officers that focused international attention on South Asia. Musharraf asserted that it was Pak's threat to use "unconventional "tactics that prevented India from launching the full scale war against his country last year. The Indian side has chosen to interpret the General's words as an undisguised threat of first use of nuclear weapons. So the announcement of Nuclear Command came after the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
A Nuclear Command Structure has been in place for quite sometime. Although the broad outline of India's nuclear doctrine was known for a while, the nature of its command and control over the atomic arsenal had remained unclear.

N-Command Structure

The government announced the formation of Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)
Which will be solely responsible for ordering a nuclear strike. NCA is a two-tier body consisting of a Political Council and an Executive Council . The Political Council to be chaired by the Prime Minister will be the sole body which will authorize the use of nuclear weapons. It represents the Civilian Leadership . An alternative chain of Command has also been approved to take charge in case the command chain is disturbed in any way.
The Executive Council will be chaired by the Principal Advisor to the Prime Minister , who will " provide inputs for the decision-making by the NCA " and “ execute the directives given to it by the Political Council” . The Executive Council will consist of top Civil Servants and Military Officials. It is expected to meet at regular intervals and keep the political leadership acquainted with the latest developments.
The Cabinet Committee also approved the appointment of " Commander-in-Chief , Strategic Forces Command " who would be responsible for the administration of the Nuclear Force .The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) will comprise of representatives from all the three military services.

POLITICAL COUNCIL 
(Head- Prime Minister) 
î 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
( Head - National Security Advisor) 
î 
CHIEF OF STAFF COMMITTEE 
( Headed By Air Force) 
î 
STRATEGIC FORCES COMMAND 
( Head Commander-in-Chief)

 

Functioning

Once the " Chief of Staff Committee " receives input from the SFC , it will provide military advise of the Political Council of the NCA through the Executive Council. The final decision has to be made by the leader (Prime Minister) in his individual capacity based on military advise specially when one is going to act only in retaliation. The Nuclear Draft Doctrine was released by National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), set up after the May 1998 tests. The recent anno8uncement has confirmed the essence of that draft as official policy. The only new element in the doctrine is the No First Use Policy. India has also pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon powers. However, in the event of a major attack against India "by biological and chemical weapons ", India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons. This stance mimics that taken by the US during the 1991 Gulf War. While India has consciously chosen not to use nuclear weapons first, it has warned (obviously aiming at Pakistan) that the nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
Alternative N-Command 
India has more than one alternative nuclear command structure in place. If there is an attack by hitting the nation's leadership " the alternative Nuclear Command Authority will be in a position to take charge "and ensure maximum retaliation. Officials insist that there are   fool-proof mechanisms in place to prevent any accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. An Alternative command puts the final touch to India's nuclear deterrent. If an enemy knows that such a command exists, but does not know where they are this will deter a surprise attack. India may have two or three alternative command structures. Both the location and nature of the command will remain a secret. 

India's doctrine is largely aimed at Pak, because of its refusal to give up the option of a Nuclear First Strike. India has been clear since Pokhran - II, that its nuclear weapons are deterrent, not offensive weapons. Adopting No First Use Policy sent a message that India is not trigger-happy. However, Pak needed to understand that if it attacked, retaliation would be massive and immediate. It is a reflection of India's sluggish decision-making process that it has taken the government more than four and a half years to formalize a Nuclear Command and control structure. But it is better late than never.

Tuesday, April 10, 2012

Hardness & Mohs Scale


The Mohs hardness scale for minerals has been used since 1822. It simply consists of 10 minerals arranged in order from 1 to 10. Diamond is rated as the hardest and is indexed as 10; talc as the softest with index number 1. Each mineral in the scale will scratch all those below it as follows:

Talk  ( 1 )  <   Gypsum ( 2 )       Calcite ( 3 )    Fluorite ( 4 )       Apatite ( 5 )       Orthoclase ( Feldspar )  ( 6 )       Quartz  ( 7 )        Topaz  ( 8 )          Corundum ( 9 )         Diamond    (  10 ) .

The steps are not of equal value and the difference in hardness between 9 and 10 is much greater than between 1 and 2. The hardness is determined by finding which of the standard minerals the test material will Scratch or Not Scratch ; the hardness will lie between two points on the scale - the first point being the mineral which is scratched and the next point being the mineral which is not scratched. Some examples of the hardness of common metals in the Mohs scale are copper between 2 and 3 and tool steel between 7 and 8. This is a simple test, but is Not Exactly Quantitative and the standards are purely arbitrary numbers.
The materials Engineer and Metallurgist find little use for the Mohs scale, but it is possible to sub-divide the scale and some derived methods are still commonly used today. The file test is useful as a rapid and portable qualitative test for hardened steels, where convention hardness testers are not available or practical. Files can be tempered back to give a range of known hardness and then used in a similar fashion to the Mohs method to evaluate hardness.


Er. Rajani Kant Singh Indra